Sign-in methods
How people sign in to CertAutoPilot: local passwords, LDAP and single sign-on (OIDC, SAML 2.0, GitHub) on one Settings โ Sign-in page โ the public URL, the one-method-per-account rule, account creation and linking, group sync, two-factor, sessions, signing out at the identity provider, and moving an account to another method.
SSO providers
Set up single sign-on providers from the catalogue โ Microsoft Entra ID, Google, Google Workspace, Okta, Keycloak, AD FS, Auth0, OneLogin, PingOne, PingFederate, GitHub, custom OIDC and custom SAML 2.0: what each needs, what to register at the provider, what CertAutoPilot checks, test sign-in, SAML metadata and service-provider keys.
Auth & RBAC
Four roles, two scopes, three kinds of identity โ local password + TOTP, LDAP/AD federation, and single sign-on through OIDC, SAML 2.0 and GitHub ([Sign-in methods](/security/sign-in)). Each account uses exactly one of them. Browser sessions are JWT in httpOnly cookies with double-submit CSRF and refresh-token reuse detection.
Resource grants
Limit a project role to the certificates, targets, credentials, modules, certificate authorities, DNS zones, discovery sources and notification objects you choose: what a grant is, how the effective role is worked out, where grants are set, and exactly what a restricted user can see and do.
User groups
Give roles and resource grants to many users at once: what a user group is, how a member's own roles and its groups' roles combine, linking groups to LDAP groups so sign-in keeps membership current, the default role for new LDAP users, and what happens when a member, group or project goes away.
Policies & approvals
Two governance gates: a project-scoped certificate policy that constrains every new issuance (key types, allowed issuers, SAN globs, naming regex, auto-renew requirement โ existing certificates are grandfathered), and a request / approve / reject workflow that interposes a human review on sensitive operations.
Audit & SIEM
HMAC-chained audit log, RFC 5424 syslog forwarding, 30-day retention with SIEM export, and an owner-only chain-verification API.
Programmatic access
Scripts, CI/CD, and service accounts call the API as a regular user: log in for a short-lived JWT access token, send it as Authorization: Bearer, and refresh with the refresh token. Header auth bypasses CSRF. There are no separate API keys โ scope automation by giving a dedicated user the minimal role.
LDAP / Active Directory
Federate logins against LDAP v3 or Active Directory โ service-account search-then-bind, LDAPS/STARTTLS, auto-provisioning on first login, and in-form connection and filter test tools.
OTP policy (2FA enforcement)
RFC 6238 TOTP with an org-wide enforcement policy (Optional or Required), forced enrollment at login, 8 one-shot recovery codes, envelope-encrypted seeds, and progressive login lockout.
Approval workflow
Four-eyes gate for certificate operations and the distribution supply chain โ a per-project approval policy naming which operators (all, or selected users and groups) need approval for issue, reissue, renew, revoke, download, configuration changes (default: all operators) and distribution actions, a generic request โ approve โ execute lifecycle with a 7-day TTL, one-time download tokens, and the My Requests review surface.
Syslog forwarding
Forward audit events to a SIEM as RFC 5424, CEF (ArcSight/Splunk), or LEEF (QRadar) syslog over UDP, TCP, or TCP+TLS (with optional mTLS) โ MongoDB-queued, retried with exponential backoff, safe across replicas.