Discovery sources
A discovery source tells CertAutoPilot where to look for certificates that are not yet managed. All sources feed the same inventory.
Source types
| Type | Input | Use case |
|---|---|---|
| CIDR / IP | IP ranges + ports | Known infrastructure — discover what's serving TLS in a subnet. |
| Hostname | FQDN list + ports | Services on cloud LBs / no stable IP. |
| DNS Zone Transfer (AXFR) | DNS resolvers + zones | SNI-routed frontends — enumerate every distinct cert behind one IP. See AXFR discovery. |
| Cloud DNS Provider | A provider connection + zones | You host DNS in the cloud (Cloudflare, Google Cloud DNS) and can't do AXFR — lists the zone's records through the provider API. See Cloud DNS discovery. |
| CT log monitor | Domains | Shadow IT — catch a cert issued outside your process. See CT monitoring. |
| Targets | Existing SSH / WinRM / IIS / Exchange targets and target groups | Certificates stored on your servers — files and the Windows certificate stores, served or not. See Server certificate scan. |
CT log monitoring depends on an external aggregator (crt.sh), which is often rate-limited or unavailable, so it is hidden from the source-type picker by default. For SNI-routed internal infrastructure, prefer AXFR — it is authoritative and needs no external service.
CIDR / IP scan
- Discovery → Sources → Add source → type CIDR / IP.
- Fields:
- Records:
10.0.0.0/24,10.0.0.1,fd00:1::/120,fd00:1::5— one CIDR or IP per row, IPv4 or IPv6, each with its own ports. A block holds at most 65536 addresses (/16IPv4,/112IPv6). Loopback, link-local (169.254.0.0/16,fe80::/10), multicast and unspecified addresses are refused whatever the public-scan setting says. - Ports: default
443. Any TLS-speaking port works (8443, LDAPS636, IMAPS993, SMTPS465), and so do services that start in plain text and upgrade with STARTTLS — see Ports and protocols. At most 64 distinct ports per record (the same limit applies to the port list of an AXFR or cloud DNS-provider source, where every zone name multiplies it); a duplicate is refused. Discovery finds certificates on known service ports — it is not a port scanner. A source saved before this limit existed can still be renamed, paused or rescheduled — the limit is enforced the moment its ports are edited. In the form each port is a chip: type it and press Enter, comma or space, or pick a common TLS or STARTTLS port from the list; on a record you can also typeport:protocol(for example2525:smtp, see Ports and protocols). A value that is not a port (1–65535) is left out and named under the field. - Several records at once (hostname and CIDR / IP sources): switch the records to Paste a list, paste hostnames or addresses one per line or separated by commas, and give the ports every entry gets — spaces around an entry are removed, an entry already in the list is skipped, and Add N to the list turns each one into its own record. Pasting a list straight into a record's address field still works and gives each entry that row's ports. A new row starts with the ports of the row above.
- Allow Public IP Scan: off by default — only private ranges (RFC 1918, and IPv6 unique-local
fc00::/7) are scanned. Turn on to scan public IPs you're authorized to assess. - Checks: the source's CA certificate, revocation, HSTS, key-exchange groups — see Certificate checks.
- Deep SNI Discovery + SNI candidate budget: see SNI-aware discovery below.
- DNS lookup timeout / pool deadline: per-source DNS tuning, see DNS resolvers.
- Schedule: either an interval (every N hours, min 24) or a day+time recurrence (selected weekdays at a fixed
HH:mmin a timezone — for off-peak/night scans). Editable later from the source detail page. - Timeout per host / Max targets: standard scan controls.
- Scan time limit (
crawl_deadline_seconds; entered in the form in minutes, default 30 min, range 1–240) — applies to every network source type, not just CIDR, and stays editable later from the source detail page: see Execution model below.
- Records:
- Save. A live estimate shows the base target count (
≈ IPs × ports); deep-SNI expansion is adaptive on top of that.
Hostname scan
Type Hostname. Records are FQDNs (app.example.com) instead of CIDRs; each is probed with its own name as SNI. Useful for endpoints that don't sit in a CIDR you can enumerate.
The name is resolved through the Discovery DNS Resolvers, and by default the
scan connects to the first address that answers. Scan every address makes each
address the name resolves to (IPv4 and IPv6, at most 16) its own endpoint — host is
the address, the SNI is the name — so every backend behind a round-robin name or a
load-balancer pool is checked, each with the certificate it actually serves.
Loopback, link-local and metadata addresses are skipped, and so is an IPv6 address
this scanner has no route to. When the name does not resolve, it is scanned by name
as before. When DNS does not answer at all (timeout, server failure), the name is not
scanned in that run and its endpoints are kept as they were — the job log says so —
instead of disappearing and coming back with the next scan. Turning the setting on or off changes how the rows are keyed: the old rows
disappear on the next scan and the new ones appear. On a multi-node install the
setting can only be turned on once every node runs a version that supports it (409
otherwise).
Ports and protocols
Most services speak TLS from the first byte. Some start in plain text and upgrade with STARTTLS; discovery runs that exchange before the TLS handshake on:
| Port | Protocol |
|---|---|
| 25, 587 | SMTP (EHLO → STARTTLS) |
| 110 | POP3 (STLS) |
| 143 | IMAP (STARTTLS) |
| 389 | LDAP (StartTLS extended operation) |
| 5432 | PostgreSQL (SSLRequest) |
| 3389 | RDP (X.224 negotiation asking for TLS / CredSSP) |
| 5222 | XMPP client stream (<starttls/>) |
| 5269 | XMPP server-to-server stream (<starttls/>) |
| 21 | FTP (AUTH TLS) |
On any other port, write the record's port as port:protocol — 2525:smtp,
10143:imap, 9389:ldap, 15432:postgres, 5223:xmpp, 5270:xmpp-server,
2121:ftp — or port:tls to force TLS from the
first byte on one of the ports above, and port:https to mark an HTTPS port other
than 443/8443 (for the HSTS check). A server that answers but does not
offer the upgrade is recorded as a failed endpoint with "server does not offer
STARTTLS". The endpoint keeps its protocol, which the inventory shows, and the
cipher enumeration and TLS 1.0/1.1 probes use the same upgrade. AXFR and cloud-DNS
sources use the table above for their ports.
Measured on Windows Server: its RDP listener also accepts a TLS handshake without the X.224 negotiation; other RDP servers (xrdp) require it.
XMPP opens its stream with the server's domain, the name the endpoint was reached by (its SNI). An XMPP server answers an address with host-unknown, so an XMPP port on a CIDR source fails with "scan it under its XMPP domain": list the domain on a hostname source (or let the scan find it as a name) instead.
Certificate checks
Every scan checks what each server presents, without extra connections:
- Chain — verified against the operating system's root store and, when set, the source's CA certificate (PEM; internal roots or intermediates). The verdict per endpoint is trusted (by the system or by the source's CA), self-signed, untrusted root (a private CA, or an intermediate the server did not send), intermediate missing (the server sent nothing that issued its certificate), CA expired or invalid; a chain sent out of issuer order is flagged too. Intermediates are not downloaded for this verdict: it judges what the server sends (see Fetch missing intermediates below). A certificate is self-signed only when its own key verifies its signature.
- Stapled OCSP — the OCSP response the server staples is verified against the issuer it sent: good, revoked, unknown, invalid (does not verify or is out of date) or none.
- Key usage — the extended key usage, flagged when it excludes TLS server use, and a CA certificate served as the server's own.
- CAA — for certificates trusted by the system roots, each DNS name's CAA records (RFC 8659: the name, then each parent) must allow the CA that issued the certificate. Asked from public DNS (Settings → General → DNS Resolvers, Google and Cloudflare by default) when findings are recomputed, at most once a day per certificate. A CA the product does not recognise, or a lookup that gets no answer, raises nothing (an earlier verdict stays).
- Lifetime — a certificate from a public CA valid for longer than the CA/Browser Forum allowed on its issue date (398 days; 200 from 15 March 2026; 100 from 15 March 2027; 47 from 15 March 2029; one day of tolerance).
Three checks are opt-in per source because they contact other systems:
- Ask the CA about revocation — after the scan, each certificate whose server did not staple a valid answer (self-signed and expired certificates excepted: there is no CA to ask, and a CA stops listing a certificate once it expires) is checked with its CA's OCSP responder, then its CRL, at most once a day per certificate, up to 500 per scan within 5 minutes. The request leaves through the same outbound policy as the managed-certificate revocation check (link-local and cloud metadata refused). A certificate whose server did not send its issuer is recorded as unknown (no issuer); on a network without access to the CA the answer is unknown. A check that gets no answer never replaces the CA's last real answer (good or revoked): that certificate is simply asked again at the next scan.
- Fetch missing intermediates (AIA) — after the scan, for each certificate whose server sent an intermediate missing or untrusted root chain, downloads the issuer certificate its Authority Information Access names (http and https only; a DER certificate, a PKCS#7 bundle or PEM; at most 1 MB per answer; up to four steps up the chain), at most once a day per certificate, up to 500 per scan within 2 minutes. The certificate page then shows whether the fetched certificates complete the chain to a trusted root and which intermediate the server should add; the incomplete chain finding names it. The endpoint's verdict does not change (intermediate missing or untrusted root): clients that do not fetch it themselves still fail. A chain that already ends at a self-signed root is not fetched for. With the revocation check on, a fetched issuer also lets the CA be asked about a certificate whose server did not send one. Same outbound policy as the revocation check.
- Check HSTS — one
HEAD /request (Host and SNI = the name, redirects not followed, body not read) to each named HTTPS endpoint (port 443, 8443 or aport:httpsrecord) readsStrict-Transport-Security. An answer that is not the site's own page — 421 Misdirected Request (the server does not serve that name), 400 or a server error — raises no HSTS missing finding. Turned off, the stored answers are removed on the next scan; an endpoint that stops answering loses its answer too. - Probe key-exchange groups — after the scan, offers every key-exchange group on its own in a TLS 1.3 handshake to each TLS 1.3 server (eight extra handshakes per server, 3 seconds each, at most 2000 servers and 5 minutes per scan) and stores the groups it accepted, so the Quantum readiness page shows a server that supports a quantum-safe group but negotiated a classical one. Turned off, the stored answers are removed on the next scan.
What each check finds is listed under Findings.
Editing a source
Open a source and choose Edit (also on each row of the sources list). To keep discovery history consistent, the edit page lets you change everything except the scope — the set of things a source scans is fixed once created:
- Read-only (scope): the source type; a CIDR range or a hostname value; the AXFR resolver selection; the cloud DNS-provider connection; a CT-log's domains.
- Add-only: zones — on a source that already lists specific zones you can add another but not remove one (removing would make that zone's endpoints look "disappeared"). A source with no zone list scans every zone its resolver/connection covers; that all-zones setting can't be narrowed to a specific list on edit (that would drop the other zones' endpoints) — create a new source for a subset. Adding a zone to a cloud DNS-provider source widens what the shared DNS token reads, so it requires an org administrator (a plain ports/schedule edit does not).
- Editable: ports, the proxied-record mode of a cloud DNS-provider source (edge / origin / both), schedule and limits, concurrency, timeout, crawl deadline, max targets, cipher-scan mode, deep-SNI, DNS timeouts, name, description, status.
To change scope (a different CIDR range, a different connection, or to drop zones), create a new source instead — an in-place scope change would false-report the old scope's certificates as gone.
AXFR & CT sources
- DNS Zone Transfer (AXFR) — name-first discovery for SNI-routed infrastructure. Full setup (DNS-side config for Windows/CoreDNS/BIND, resolvers, security): AXFR discovery.
- CT log monitor — Certificate Transparency audit for domains you own: CT monitoring.
SNI-aware discovery (deep SNI)
A single IP:port behind an ingress / content switch / virtual-host LB can serve many certificates, selected by the SNI in the TLS handshake. An SNI-less scan sees at most one of them (often a default/placeholder cert, or fails outright when the server enforces SNI). With Deep SNI Discovery on (the default), a network scan probes each responsive IP with additional server names to surface the hidden certificates:
- SAN-snowball — server names mined from the SANs of certificates already retrieved on that IP.
- Reverse DNS (PTR) — the name(s) the IP reverse-resolves to.
- Cross-source candidate pool — hostnames known to the project (previously discovered SANs, managed-cert domains, tracked domains, CT observations) that forward-resolve into the scanned range, plus the names an endpoint answered for in an earlier scan (asked again so a still-served certificate is not reported as gone).
Each candidate is fingerprint-deduplicated, so exploration terminates. The SNI candidate budget (default 25, max 200) caps probes per IP:port — when it's reached the run logs a warning (never a silent miss). For authoritative enumeration behind SNI routing, use an AXFR source instead of relying on the candidate pool.
Endpoints record how each was found — discovery_method (no SNI, SAN crawl,
reverse DNS, candidate pool, hostname, zone transfer, cloud DNS) and the
SNI used — and are flagged SNI required when the IP rejects SNI-less handshakes.
Hover a method tag for what it means; Labels explained (on every discovery page)
lists every tag the discovery pages show — methods, endpoint labels, status, chain and
cipher checks, key exchange, quantum readiness and finding status.
A row born from a proxied cloud-DNS record also
carries an Edge or Origin tag; a failed origin that never answered while its
name served a certificate at the edge reads Origin · Cloudflare-only (see the
proxied-records section).
Name mismatch, and the names the crawler makes up. When a server answers a
name with a certificate that does not cover it (no SAN or CN matches, RFC 6125
single-label wildcards only), the scanner looks at a second fact before recording
anything: does DNS actually point that name at this address? Deep SNI invents
many of the names it tries — the apex a wildcard SAN yields (example.com from
*.example.com), SANs of a certificate seen on the address, reverse-DNS names — and a
server answers a made-up name with the same fallback certificate whatever the name
is, so such an answer says nothing about the name. Therefore:
- A name the crawler derived, that DNS answers with no address at this host
(NXDOMAIN or a different address), served with a certificate that does not
cover it, is not recorded at all — no endpoint row, and no certificate that
only that probe would have found. The scan log counts them ("N crawler-derived
names not recorded"). A row an earlier scan recorded for such a name while it
served the same fallback certificate is removed on the next scan without an
endpoint gone alert — it never was a real endpoint.
example.comtried on the IP ofapp.example.comand answered with*.hosting-provider.netis this case. - A name DNS points at this address, or one that is authoritative for the row
(the source's own record, a zone-transfer or cloud-DNS name, any row on a
proxied edge/origin address), answered with a certificate that does not cover
it, is recorded and flagged Name mismatch (
name_mismatch; counted per address asmismatch_count). That is what a real client would send, and a browser would reject the answer — either the name is not hosted there and got the fallback certificate, or it is hosted with the wrong one. - A crawler-derived name whose answer does cover it is a real SNI-routed site and keeps its row — that is what deep SNI exists to find.
- A previously recorded name that used to serve its own certificate and now gets the fallback one, with DNS moved away, is a decommissioned site: it is left to the disappearance sweep (and its endpoint gone event), never deleted silently.
What the DNS check is, and is not. It uses the operator's discovery resolvers,
once per name per scan, on the scan's own time limit. A lookup DNS did not
answer (timeout, resolver down) is never read as "does not resolve": the row is
kept and flagged instead, and after a few consecutive failures DNS is not consulted
again that scan. The same conservative outcome applies past the 2000-names-per-scan
cap. Two consequences follow: a name you care about that has no DNS record (a
hosts-file name, a name kept only in a certificate) is recorded only if you list
it as a hostname record of a source, which makes it authoritative; and a
misbound name behind a load balancer or CDN is caught on the address DNS points
at (or through a cloud-DNS source), not on a backend scanned by CIDR. Sources that
probe an address without SNI first (CIDR/IP, AXFR, cloud-DNS origins) additionally
fold a name that returns the address's own SNI-less certificate, uncovered, into
that row as seen via. The flag raises a hostname_mismatch finding; the drop
raises nothing — see Findings.
Cipher-suite enumeration
A plain scan records only the one cipher suite the server negotiates with the scanner's modern client — so a host that still accepts RC4/3DES/CBC but prefers AES-GCM to a modern client looks clean. Cipher Suite Enumeration actively probes which suites the server accepts (one pinned single-suite handshake per suite × TLS version) and flags the weak ones a downgrade-capable client could still negotiate.
Set the mode per source (network, hostname, and AXFR sources — not CT log):
- Off — no extra handshakes. Legacy sources created before this feature resolve to Off, so a re-scan stays cost-neutral.
- Vulnerable only (recommended) — probes just the risky suites (RC4, 3DES, legacy CBC, and static-RSA no-forward-secrecy). New sources default to this.
- Selected suites — pick exactly which suites to probe from the multi-select (risky ones are red-tagged).
- All (full inventory) — probes every suite the scanner can offer, including the
strong AEAD+PFS ones, and records the complete accepted set on the endpoint (the raw
cipher_scan.acceptedlist, available via the API). The UI highlights only the weak/risky accepted suites (the strong ones raise no finding and aren't tagged), so useallwhen you want the full machine-readable inventory rather than extra UI detail.
Coverage is TLS 1.0–1.2. The scanner offers RC4, 3DES, CBC and static-RSA
(no-PFS) suites and probes them at each in-scope TLS version (a suite accepted on
TLS 1.0 is scored differently from one on TLS 1.2). NULL, EXPORT, raw DES and
SSLv3 cannot be offered by the scanner and are out of scope — use a dedicated
external scanner (e.g. sslyze, testssl.sh) for those. TLS 1.3 suites are always
safe and are not enumerated.
Three outcomes per probe: accepted (handshake succeeded), rejected (the server refused the suite — a valid negative), and failed (timeout / transport / policy block — no verdict). A scan is complete only when every planned probe returned a verdict; the inventory and certificate detail mark an incomplete scan partial — X of Y probes so an empty result from a slow/tarpit host is never misread as "clean".
Enumeration honours the same SNI and outbound network policy as the primary probe,
is bounded per endpoint by a wall-clock budget and a worker-wide concurrency ceiling,
and feeds the endpoint's weak_cipher / no_pfs risk factors plus a dedicated
weak_cipher_accepted endpoint finding.
Enumeration runs as a separate phase after the endpoint scan finishes, on its own
concurrency pool — so it never slows down base discovery or starves other sources' scans,
even on a large all-mode source. One baseline endpoint is enumerated per host:port.
Bounded per scan. To keep a large CIDR × All from launching millions of extra handshakes, each scan cipher-enumerates at most a fixed number of endpoints (5000); beyond that, endpoints are scanned normally but not cipher-probed. The run summary / job log always reports how many endpoints were enumerated, how many were skipped by this cap, and how many enumerations were incomplete (budget/transport) — the cap is never silent.
Stable across a scan, never stale after it. While cipher scanning stays enabled, an
endpoint's stored enumeration remains visible for the whole scan instead of being cleared
the moment the endpoint is re-probed — so a scan in progress can't make
weak_cipher_accepted findings resolve and immediately reopen. Once the cipher pass has
run, any result it did not re-verify this scan is dropped: an endpoint skipped by the
per-scan cap or the pass deadline ends the scan with no cipher data (an honest "not
checked"), never with an older verdict shown as current. Switching the source's cipher
scanning off clears the stored results on its next scan.
DNS resolvers
Deep SNI's forward/reverse resolution and AXFR need a resolver that can see your internal / split-horizon names:
- Settings → Discovery → Discovery DNS Resolvers — DNS servers the scanner uses to resolve candidate names, hostname records and reverse-DNS — including the name a hostname source connects to. Kept separate from the DV-propagation resolvers (which are usually public). Empty = the worker's system resolver (not the public DV resolvers, which can't see internal names).
- The checks that run after the scan use the same resolvers: the HSTS check and cipher enumeration reach each server exactly as the scan did, and the AIA fetch and revocation check (OCSP / CRL) ask them first for the CA's host — an internal CA's web server is often known only to your internal DNS. A CA host they do not know (for example a public CA's host when these resolvers answer internal names only) is then looked up with the worker's system resolver.
- Per source: DNS lookup timeout (default 2 s) and DNS pool deadline (default 30 s) bound resolution time.
Security & policy
Network scans route every dial through the outbound network policy:
- Cloud-metadata (
169.254.169.254, …), link-local, loopback, unspecified, and CGNAT addresses are always refused — even if listed explicitly or returned by a zone/PTR/candidate. - CIDR sources pin egress to exactly the declared ranges; AXFR sources pin to the exact IPs resolved from the zone (DNS-rebinding safe).
- Public IPs are only scanned when Allow Public IP Scan is enabled.
Execution model
- A source is executed by a
discovery_executejob on the worker queue. - The scheduler sweeps active sources on their cadence; manual triggers bypass it. A schedule changed while a scan runs is kept: the scan moves the next scan time on only when nobody changed it meanwhile. A scheduled scan that waited in the queue while the schedule moved to a later time does not run, and its job log says why (a manual scan, or a scheduled one retried from the Jobs page, always runs).
- Results are written to the inventory as each endpoint is probed, not in one batch at the end — so the inventory fills in progressively during a long scan. A scan that is interrupted (worker shutdown) is marked cancelled and keeps what it had already recorded (its new-certificate / certificate-changed notifications are sent for that partial set); the remaining scope is covered by the next run.
- A scan with partial coverage is marked partial; in both the cancelled and
partial cases the disappearance sweep is skipped so still-live endpoints aren't
falsely removed. Coverage is treated as partial (sweep deferred) when: some AXFR
zones failed, a database write failed, a previously-known endpoint was skipped
this run due to error backoff (
>3consecutive failures in 24h), the SNI candidate budget was reached on a heavily virtual-hosted IP, the crawl deadline was reached, or the source was re-claimed by a newer run mid-scan (superseded). This is deliberately conservative: a genuinely-gone endpoint that is currently backed off stays as failed (its certificate retained) until a later complete run confirms the removal, rather than risking a false removal. - A server that keeps failing is not kept forever: once it has failed every scan for 30 days, the next scan marks its rows gone (an endpoint gone event) and a certificate nothing else serves leaves the inventory — also on a scan with partial coverage, since the rule rests on recorded failures only — see Servers that stop answering. Rows of addresses that never answered stay as failed rows; they hold no certificate.
- Scan time limit (
crawl_deadline_seconds; set in the source form and the source detail page in minutes — default 30 min, range 1–240, stored as seconds and clamped server-side to 60–14400) bounds the wall-clock time of the whole scan phase, for every network source type (CIDR, hostname, AXFR). Because results are persisted as they arrive, database write latency counts against this budget — on a very large source with a slow or remote MongoDB, raise the deadline (or split the source) if runs start finishing aspartialwith a "crawl deadline reached" warning in the job log.
What is stored
discovered_certificates— subject, SANs, issuer, validity, SHA-256 fingerprint, key/signature algorithm, PQC classification (PQC readiness).discovered_certificatesalso keeps the extended key usage, the last revocation answer of the CA and the CAA verdict (Certificate checks).discovered_endpoints— one row per(source, host, port, SNI)where the cert was seen, plus the protocol (STARTTLS), the chain and stapled-OCSP verdicts, the HSTS answer, TLS version, cipher suite, negotiated key-exchange group (quantum-safe KEX classification), discovery method, the edge/origin role for a proxied cloud-DNS record, the observing source, and — when cipher enumeration is on — the accepted-suite scan result (accepted suites × version, plus rejected/failed counts and completeness).
The same IP:port:SNI found by two sources appears once per source. The screens group these rows into servers — one per address and port, with its names and the sources that saw it inside (see Servers); a source's Servers tab shows the servers it reached, and every count of places counts servers, not rows.
Re-runs and drift
A re-scan confirms existing entries or records a drift (fingerprint / issuer / key / SAN change) as a per-endpoint change with history — see findings.
The same history records changes to the TLS settings of an endpoint whose
certificate did not change, with the values before and after: TLS version
lowered or raised, negotiated cipher weaker (no forward secrecy, or a weak suite) or
stronger, post-quantum key exchange lost or gained, chain no longer trusted or
trusted again. Only facts both scans measured are compared — the TLS 1.0/1.1 probes
and cipher enumeration are best-effort and stay out. A change for the worse is
also sent as discovery.cert_changed, saying the certificate itself is unchanged —
except a lost post-quantum key exchange, which is sent as discovery.kex_downgraded
(also when the certificate was replaced in the same scan).
Entries are kept 365 days.
Scan health
Each source gets a health verdict from its last 10 runs (run records are kept for 30 days). It is shown in the Health column of the Sources tab, on the source's page and on the Overview page.
| Verdict | When |
|---|---|
| Healthy | The last finished scan covered its targets and nothing below applies. |
| Scanning | A scan is running now and the previous one was healthy. |
| Paused | The source is paused. |
| Not scanned yet | No scan has finished. |
| Needs attention | The last scan was partial (some targets not scanned) or cancelled; it reached its SNI candidate or target limit; more than half of the scanned endpoints failed; the cipher check did not finish or skipped endpoints over its limit; it reached at least 20 points fewer endpoints than the earlier scans on average; or the next scheduled scan is more than an hour overdue with no scan running. |
| Failing | The last scan failed, or 3 scans in a row ended with an error. |
CT-log sources are judged on run status only (they have no SNI budget, endpoints or cipher check). Skipped runs (another scan held the source) are ignored.
Troubleshooting
Scan finds fewer certs than expected behind an ingress
The certs are SNI-routed and the candidate pool didn't have their names. Set up an AXFR source for authoritative enumeration, or add a Discovery DNS Resolver pointing at your internal DNS so candidate names resolve into the scanned range.
Scan is slow over WAN
Lower Timeout per host; unreachable hosts fail faster. Lower the SNI candidate budget to reduce handshakes per IP.
Scan result: network policy block
You targeted a refused address (metadata, link-local, loopback). Adjust the range, or point an AXFR/hostname source at reachable internal IPs.
See also
Video tutorials
Short, hands-on videos showing this feature working for real. English audio, English and Turkish subtitles. All video tutorials →