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PQC readiness

Discovery measures two separate things for post-quantum readiness:

  • the key exchange each endpoint negotiates — whether a recorded session could be decrypted later by a quantum computer. This is a server setting and can be changed today;
  • the certificate key of each discovered certificate — what it is signed with. Four buckets: vulnerable, transition, ready, unknown.

Both are shown together on Discovery → Quantum readiness, see the page. The certificate bucket also feeds the risk score and the findings.

The Quantum readiness page​

Open it from Discovery → Quantum readiness, or with Details on the inventory's Quantum readiness card. It shows, for the selected project:

  • Key exchange on servers — the servers (host:port) whose last scan served a certificate (a failed scan leaves a row out), counted as Quantum-safe (hybrid ML-KEM, or ML-KEM alone), Classical, RSA (no PFS) (only shown when present) and Not recorded yet (scanned before CertAutoPilot recorded the key exchange — the next scan of the source records it — or a group CertAutoPilot does not recognise). A server answers on several endpoint rows — one without a name and one per certificate name, and once more for every source that scans it — and counts once, by its weakest row (an SNI router that sends one name to a classical backend counts as classical). Under it: how many endpoint rows the servers come from, how many of the ones that are not quantum-safe negotiate TLS 1.2 or older, and how many support a quantum-safe group but negotiated a classical one (see group probe).
  • Certificate keys — the four buckets below. Each part opens the inventory filtered to it.
  • What the scan results ask for — only the statements the numbers support: servers that are not quantum-safe, those that already support a quantum-safe group (put it first in their group preference), those that need TLS 1.3 first, and certificates with an RSA key shorter than 2048 bits. How to enable a hybrid group depends on the server software, which CertAutoPilot does not tell you.
  • Servers — the servers by key exchange (Not quantum-safe, Quantum-safe, Not recorded yet, All), optionally only those on TLS 1.2 or older: each address and port once, with its certificate, names, oldest TLS version and weakest key exchange (the server list with its filters and columns). A server opens its page, which shows the negotiated group, the groups the server supports (when probed) and its history. Export downloads the view shown as CSV or JSON, one row per name (see Endpoint export).
  • Groups negotiated — how many servers use each key-exchange group.
  • Recent key-exchange changes — the 50 newest changes in which an endpoint started or stopped negotiating a quantum-safe key exchange.
  • By source — each source's servers by key exchange (a server two sources scan counts under both).
  • Over time — the share of quantum-safe servers per day for the last 90 days. Each scan of a source, and the hourly findings refresh, records that day's numbers (kept 400 days); a day without either has no bar. For a user limited to some sources it is the sum of those sources.

A user limited to some discovery sources sees only what those sources found.

There is no finding for a classical key exchange: today most servers negotiate one, and a finding per endpoint would only be noise. The page lists them instead. A server that stops negotiating a quantum-safe key exchange sends the notification event discovery.kex_downgraded (see notifications).

The page covers the servers your discovery sources scan, not CertAutoPilot's own connections (to CAs, distribution targets or identity providers).

Classification buckets​

BucketWhat qualifiesInterpretation
VulnerableRSA < 2048Already too weak against pre-quantum attacks, let alone quantum. Fix now regardless of PQC.
TransitionAll other classical: RSA 2048+, ECDSA P-256/P-384/P-521, Ed25519Safe today. Will be broken by a cryptographically-relevant quantum computer (CRQC). Rotate to a PQC or hybrid scheme once browsers / CAs support it.
ReadyA post-quantum signature key: ML-DSA (FIPS 204, shown with its parameter set, e.g. ML-DSA-65)The target state. Public CAs do not issue ML-DSA certificates yet, so expect them from internal CAs first.
UnknownAny algorithm other than RSA, ECDSA or Ed25519 (DSA included), or a key whose algorithm could not be readLook at it. Often indicates a mis-extracted cert or an experimental algorithm.

Why RSA 2048 is Transition, not Vulnerable​

RSA 2048 is still considered pre-quantum strong in 2026 — NIST recommends it through the end of this decade. The moment a CRQC appears, every RSA-2048 (and every classical ECC) becomes trivially breakable. The vulnerable bucket is reserved for keys that were already sub-standard before quantum entered the picture — RSA-1024 is a concrete example.

How classification runs​

  1. Discovery scan extracts the public key.
  2. The classifier looks at the key algorithm and key size: RSA below 2048 bits is vulnerable; RSA 2048+, every ECDSA curve and Ed25519 are transition.
  3. ECDSA curves are identified by key size (P-256 / P-384 / P-521), which the inventory shows as the key size.
  4. An ML-DSA key is ready; its key size is its parameter set (44, 65 or 87).
  5. Anything else is tagged unknown. A certificate whose key the scanner cannot use at all (SLH-DSA, composite keys) does not complete the handshake, so it is not recorded.

Key-exchange PQC (harvest-now-decrypt-later)​

Certificate classification above is about the signature (authenticity — broken after a CRQC exists). The key exchange is a separate axis and the one that bites today: an attacker can record TLS sessions now and decrypt them once a CRQC arrives ("harvest-now-decrypt-later"), unless the handshake used a hybrid post-quantum key exchange.

For every endpoint whose main handshake completes, the scanner records the negotiated key-exchange group (TLS 1.3, or the ECDHE curve of TLS 1.2) and classifies it:

KEX classExample groupsMeaning
Quantum-safeX25519MLKEM768, SecP256r1MLKEM768, SecP384r1MLKEM1024 (hybrid ML-KEM)Session keys resist harvest-now-decrypt-later.
Quantum-safe (ML-KEM only)MLKEM1024ML-KEM without a classical part — also quantum-safe.
ClassicalX25519, P-256, P-384Standard ECDHE — forward secret, but not quantum-safe.
RSA (no PFS)legacy RSA key exchangeNo forward secrecy and not quantum-safe.

This is per-endpoint (a property of the server's TLS config), not per-cert — the same cert can be quantum-safe on one endpoint and classical on another depending on what each server negotiates. Discovery → Inventory shows it in the Quantum readiness card and in the server lists' Key exchange column (a server's weakest name); the Quantum readiness page lists the servers by it.

What the result means:

  • The scan offers the quantum-safe groups, the server chooses. The scan's main handshake (the one the key exchange is recorded from) offers X25519MLKEM768, SecP256r1MLKEM768, SecP384r1MLKEM1024 and MLKEM1024 before the classical groups; the cipher and TLS 1.0/1.1 probes are TLS 1.2 or older and offer none. A server that supports a quantum-safe group but prefers a classical one is recorded as classical — which is also what other clients offering these groups get. The group probe shows what such a server supports.
  • TLS 1.2 cannot be quantum-safe. Hybrid groups exist only in TLS 1.3, so an endpoint that negotiates TLS 1.2 needs TLS 1.3 before a hybrid group can be enabled.
  • RSA key exchange. The main handshake does not offer RSA key exchange. When a server refuses it, the scan asks once more offering only RSA key exchange (TLS 1.2 or older): a server that accepts nothing else is recorded with its certificate as RSA (no PFS). That second handshake is made only for servers that refused the first one (an unreachable server, or one that did not answer within the timeout, gets none).

Group probe​

A source's Probe key-exchange groups check (off by default) offers, after each scan, every group on its own in a TLS 1.3 handshake to each TLS 1.3 server the scan reached: MLKEM1024, X25519MLKEM768, SecP256r1MLKEM768, SecP384r1MLKEM1024, X25519, P-256, P-384, P-521 — eight extra handshakes per server (3 seconds each, at most 2000 servers and 5 minutes per scan). The groups the server completed a handshake with are shown on its rows (Supports quantum-safe, not used when it negotiated a classical group anyway). When a probe gets no answer (nothing listens, or the handshake times out) the list is marked incomplete and the remaining groups are not tried for that server. Turning the check off removes the stored answers at the next scan.

Notifications​

When a server that negotiated a quantum-safe key exchange negotiates a classical or RSA one, the scan sends discovery.kex_downgraded (severity warning) once per server, with the server, its name, the group before and after, and the source; more than five in one scan of a source are sent as one summary with examples. The change is also kept in the server's history — also when the certificate was replaced in the same scan. A notification rule selects the event like any other; a rule limited to some sources only gets those sources' servers. It is no longer sent as discovery.cert_changed (TLS settings got worse), which still reports a TLS version or cipher downgrade.

Risk score integration​

Vulnerable keys add 10 to the certificate's risk score. Transition adds nothing (it is the expected state for classical certs). Ready and Unknown also contribute zero. Two signals are shown with the score but add no points: PQC readiness could not be determined (unknown) and Key exchange is classical — when none of the certificate's endpoints negotiates a quantum-safe key exchange. See risk scoring for where in the risk flow this slots in.

Findings​

Every cert classified vulnerable emits a pqc_vulnerable finding at severity Low, whose remediation says to plan migration to ECDSA P-256 or larger, or to post-quantum algorithms when available. A classical key exchange raises no finding. See findings.

Stats surfaces​

  • Discovery → Quantum readiness — the whole picture, see the page.
  • Discovery → Inventory — the Quantum readiness card counts certificates per bucket and endpoints per key exchange (each part filters the list or opens the Quantum readiness page), and a PQC column shows each certificate's bucket.
  • Individual cert detail — status badge + short explanation.

PQC readiness is not an input to the 47-day readiness score, which measures automation, distribution coverage and manual-DNS use.

Roadmap​

CertAutoPilot does not issue post-quantum certificate keys: no public CA issues ML-DSA web certificates yet. As IETF finalises hybrid composite schemes (e.g. id-MLDSA44-ECDSA-P256) and CAs start issuing them, CertAutoPilot will add recognition for each new algorithm. Classification is a lookup in the backend — an upgrade picks up newly classifiable algorithms without any operator action.

Troubleshooting​

Too many unknown​

Either the certificate uses an algorithm the classifier does not bucket (DSA, for example) or the scan could not read its key. Check the Key column in the inventory; re-scan the endpoint, and if it is still unknown fetch the certificate yourself (openssl s_client -connect host:port -servername name | openssl x509 -text) to see the algorithm.

"My org does not care about PQC yet, how do I mute these findings?"​

Suppress the pqc_vulnerable findings with a note recording the decision. Suppression survives later scans, and the note is a breadcrumb for the next auditor — so you can point at the policy decision rather than looking like you missed the issue. Several findings can be suppressed at once with the findings page's bulk action; a suppression has no expiry.

See also​

Video tutorial

Short, hands-on videos showing this feature working for real. English audio, English and Turkish subtitles. All video tutorials →

Certificate Findings, Quantum Readiness and Tag RulesYouTube ↗