Issuance walkthrough
Every form field on the New Certificate page, what it does, and what happens after you click Submit. Includes key-type guidance, policy enforcement, manual DNS, and CSR upload.
Form fields
| Field | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Issuer | yes | An ACME account, an AD CS connection or a CA connection in the current project. A CA connection also takes a product (its default unless you pick one). |
| Common name | yes | The primary subject (the first name). With automatic DNS it must be under a registered zone. |
| SANs | no | Up to 1000 names per request — your CA imposes its own limit (Let's Encrypt and Google Trust Services allow 100 identifiers; commercial multi-domain products often 250) and exceeding it fails at order time, not at submit. Set san_rules.max_san_count in the certificate policy to enforce a limit locally. With automatic DNS each name must be under a registered zone — names may be in different zones, each validated with its own zone's credential (Names in several zones). A CA connector's vendor may cap the count (GlobalSign Atlas: one name) — that is refused at submit with CA_CONNECTOR_SAN_LIMIT. A CA-connector certificate takes one zone, which needs a DNS credential; for a vendor that validates domains on its account (GlobalSign Atlas) the zone is optional (CA connectors). |
| Key type | yes | ECDSA P-256 / P-384, RSA 2048 / 3072 / 4096. A CA connector narrows the list to what its vendor accepts and defaults to the vendor's choice (GlobalSign Atlas: RSA only, default RSA 2048). |
| Auto-renew | yes | Default on. Renewal window configurable. |
| Distribution targets | no | List of pre-configured targets to push to on every successful issuance/renewal. |
| Approval required | — | Not a form field: when the project's approval policy gates issuance for an operator, that operator's submit raises an approval request instead. |
For ACME certificates the names are stored in their wire form: lower-case, without a trailing dot, and an internationalised name as its punycode (xn--) form. Two spellings of one name (Example.com and example.com.) are refused as a duplicate, and a * is accepted only as the whole first label (*.example.com).
Choosing a key type
- ECDSA P-256 — the right default. Smallest, fastest handshake, lowest CPU, supported everywhere modern.
- ECDSA P-384 — for higher-assurance use cases. Same wins, larger margin.
- RSA 2048 — when a downstream device only speaks RSA (older F5 partitions, ancient JVMs).
- RSA 3072 / 4096 — only when a compliance regime demands it. Significantly slower TLS handshake.
Policy enforcement
The project's certificate policy can restrict what is accepted:
- Allowed issuer types and specific issuers (e.g. only the production ACME account in the production project).
- Allowed key types (an explicit list — there is no "minimum size" rule).
- SAN allow / deny globs (e.g. every domain must match
*.example.com; deny*.internal) and a maximum SAN count. - A naming regex for the certificate name.
- Mandatory auto-renew.
A request that violates the policy is rejected with HTTP 422 and a structured list of violations — nothing is created and no job is enqueued. There is no per-request override and no admin bypass: change the policy, or change the request.
Bring-your-own CSR — not supported
CertAutoPilot always generates the key pair itself and builds the CSR internally; there is no way to supply your own PKCS#10. If your requirement is that the private key never exists outside a device or HSM, this product cannot satisfy it today — import an externally issued certificate instead, or issue through your device's own enrolment path.
Manual DNS
For zones not delegated to a supported DNS provider — say, a registrar's homepage with no API. CertAutoPilot pauses the job, shows the exact TXT record to publish, and resumes after you click I've added it.
Manual DNS disables auto-renewal automatically (we cannot publish records you have to set by hand). Only use for one-off certs.
HTTP validation
No DNS access at all? Pick HTTP: route the ACME challenge path (/.well-known/acme-challenge/*) on each domain to CertAutoPilot at your edge (gateway / ingress / reverse proxy — CertAutoPilot can stay internal), and the CA validates over port 80 — no zone, no DNS credential, immediate validation, auto-renew fully supported. Wildcards are not possible with HTTP validation. See HTTP validation.
Approval workflow
If approval is required, submitting the form creates a request in My Requests rather than starting the issuance job. Approvers receive a notification (if a rule routes approval.requested), review the request (including any preflight warnings), and approve it or reject it with an optional reason; an approved request is then executed explicitly. Self-approval is blocked, and admins and owners issue directly.
What happens after submit
-
Worker creates an ACME order (or AD CS enrollment, or a vendor order through a CA connector).
-
For ACME with automated DNS, issuance is phased across three jobs, not one.
issue_certificatepublishes the DNS-01 TXT records and hands off — it completing quickly does not mean the certificate was issued. -
await_dns_propagationpolls DNS on its own schedule without holding a worker, up to the propagation deadline (default 30 minutes, configurable 5 minutes–4 hours).finalize_orderthen accepts the challenges, finalises the order and downloads the certificate.Manual DNS, HTTP-01, the sequential RRset-replacing provider rfc2136, and Cloudflare, DigitalOcean, OVH and Plesk use the older single-job synchronous flow instead — those four delete their TXT record from the process that created it, so they cannot use the phased flow's separate cleanup job.
A CA connector certificate is also phased:
ca_place_orderplaces the vendor order and writes the vendor's DCV record (CNAME or TXT) into the zone,ca_poll_orderwaits for the record to propagate and then polls the vendor until it issues (bounded by the CA Order Deadline, default 72 h), andca_cleanup_dcvremoves the record. See CA connectors. -
Worker stores the certificate and chain, plus the private key envelope-encrypted with a DEK wrapped by the KEK. The certificate and chain themselves are public data and are stored as-is.
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Distribution targets fire (if configured) — fan-out, dry-run optional.
-
Timeline events recorded:
cert.issued, then onecert.distributedper deployed target (plus the corresponding audit-log entries).cert.requestedappears for an AD CS enrollment that waits for CA-manager approval and for a CA-connector order once it is placed (vendor, order id and DCV record in the metadata). -
Renewal scheduler picks up the new cert and computes its renewal window.
API
POST /api/v1/projects/{project}/certificates
GET /api/v1/projects/{project}/certificates/{id}
POST /api/v1/projects/{project}/certificates/{id}/renew
POST /api/v1/projects/{project}/certificates/{id}/revoke
GET /api/v1/projects/{project}/certificates/{id}/timeline
See also
Video tutorials
Short, hands-on videos showing this feature working for real. English audio, English and Turkish subtitles. All video tutorials →