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Issuance walkthrough

Every form field on the New Certificate page, what it does, and what happens after you click Submit. Includes key-type guidance, policy enforcement, manual DNS, and CSR upload.

Form fields​

FieldRequiredNotes
IssueryesAn ACME account, an AD CS connection or a CA connection in the current project. A CA connection also takes a product (its default unless you pick one).
Common nameyesThe primary subject (the first name). With automatic DNS it must be under a registered zone.
SANsnoUp to 1000 names per request — your CA imposes its own limit (Let's Encrypt and Google Trust Services allow 100 identifiers; commercial multi-domain products often 250) and exceeding it fails at order time, not at submit. Set san_rules.max_san_count in the certificate policy to enforce a limit locally. With automatic DNS each name must be under a registered zone — names may be in different zones, each validated with its own zone's credential (Names in several zones). A CA connector's vendor may cap the count (GlobalSign Atlas: one name) — that is refused at submit with CA_CONNECTOR_SAN_LIMIT. A CA-connector certificate takes one zone, which needs a DNS credential; for a vendor that validates domains on its account (GlobalSign Atlas) the zone is optional (CA connectors).
Key typeyesECDSA P-256 / P-384, RSA 2048 / 3072 / 4096. A CA connector narrows the list to what its vendor accepts and defaults to the vendor's choice (GlobalSign Atlas: RSA only, default RSA 2048).
Auto-renewyesDefault on. Renewal window configurable.
Distribution targetsnoList of pre-configured targets to push to on every successful issuance/renewal.
Approval required—Not a form field: when the project's approval policy gates issuance for an operator, that operator's submit raises an approval request instead.

For ACME certificates the names are stored in their wire form: lower-case, without a trailing dot, and an internationalised name as its punycode (xn--) form. Two spellings of one name (Example.com and example.com.) are refused as a duplicate, and a * is accepted only as the whole first label (*.example.com).

Choosing a key type​

  • ECDSA P-256 — the right default. Smallest, fastest handshake, lowest CPU, supported everywhere modern.
  • ECDSA P-384 — for higher-assurance use cases. Same wins, larger margin.
  • RSA 2048 — when a downstream device only speaks RSA (older F5 partitions, ancient JVMs).
  • RSA 3072 / 4096 — only when a compliance regime demands it. Significantly slower TLS handshake.

Policy enforcement​

The project's certificate policy can restrict what is accepted:

  • Allowed issuer types and specific issuers (e.g. only the production ACME account in the production project).
  • Allowed key types (an explicit list — there is no "minimum size" rule).
  • SAN allow / deny globs (e.g. every domain must match *.example.com; deny *.internal) and a maximum SAN count.
  • A naming regex for the certificate name.
  • Mandatory auto-renew.

A request that violates the policy is rejected with HTTP 422 and a structured list of violations — nothing is created and no job is enqueued. There is no per-request override and no admin bypass: change the policy, or change the request.

Bring-your-own CSR — not supported​

CertAutoPilot always generates the key pair itself and builds the CSR internally; there is no way to supply your own PKCS#10. If your requirement is that the private key never exists outside a device or HSM, this product cannot satisfy it today — import an externally issued certificate instead, or issue through your device's own enrolment path.

Manual DNS​

For zones not delegated to a supported DNS provider — say, a registrar's homepage with no API. CertAutoPilot pauses the job, shows the exact TXT record to publish, and resumes after you click I've added it.

Manual DNS disables auto-renewal automatically (we cannot publish records you have to set by hand). Only use for one-off certs.

HTTP validation​

No DNS access at all? Pick HTTP: route the ACME challenge path (/.well-known/acme-challenge/*) on each domain to CertAutoPilot at your edge (gateway / ingress / reverse proxy — CertAutoPilot can stay internal), and the CA validates over port 80 — no zone, no DNS credential, immediate validation, auto-renew fully supported. Wildcards are not possible with HTTP validation. See HTTP validation.

Approval workflow​

If approval is required, submitting the form creates a request in My Requests rather than starting the issuance job. Approvers receive a notification (if a rule routes approval.requested), review the request (including any preflight warnings), and approve it or reject it with an optional reason; an approved request is then executed explicitly. Self-approval is blocked, and admins and owners issue directly.

What happens after submit​

  1. Worker creates an ACME order (or AD CS enrollment, or a vendor order through a CA connector).

  2. For ACME with automated DNS, issuance is phased across three jobs, not one. issue_certificate publishes the DNS-01 TXT records and hands off — it completing quickly does not mean the certificate was issued.

  3. await_dns_propagation polls DNS on its own schedule without holding a worker, up to the propagation deadline (default 30 minutes, configurable 5 minutes–4 hours). finalize_order then accepts the challenges, finalises the order and downloads the certificate.

    Manual DNS, HTTP-01, the sequential RRset-replacing provider rfc2136, and Cloudflare, DigitalOcean, OVH and Plesk use the older single-job synchronous flow instead — those four delete their TXT record from the process that created it, so they cannot use the phased flow's separate cleanup job.

    A CA connector certificate is also phased: ca_place_order places the vendor order and writes the vendor's DCV record (CNAME or TXT) into the zone, ca_poll_order waits for the record to propagate and then polls the vendor until it issues (bounded by the CA Order Deadline, default 72 h), and ca_cleanup_dcv removes the record. See CA connectors.

  4. Worker stores the certificate and chain, plus the private key envelope-encrypted with a DEK wrapped by the KEK. The certificate and chain themselves are public data and are stored as-is.

  5. Distribution targets fire (if configured) — fan-out, dry-run optional.

  6. Timeline events recorded: cert.issued, then one cert.distributed per deployed target (plus the corresponding audit-log entries). cert.requested appears for an AD CS enrollment that waits for CA-manager approval and for a CA-connector order once it is placed (vendor, order id and DCV record in the metadata).

  7. Renewal scheduler picks up the new cert and computes its renewal window.

API​

POST /api/v1/projects/{project}/certificates
GET /api/v1/projects/{project}/certificates/{id}
POST /api/v1/projects/{project}/certificates/{id}/renew
POST /api/v1/projects/{project}/certificates/{id}/revoke
GET /api/v1/projects/{project}/certificates/{id}/timeline

See also​

Video tutorials

Short, hands-on videos showing this feature working for real. English audio, English and Turkish subtitles. All video tutorials →

Issue Your First Certificate with Let’s Encrypt and DNS-01YouTube ↗
Multi-Domain (SAN) Certificates — Google Trust Services and 100 NamesYouTube ↗
Wildcard Certificate from Let’s Encrypt with DNS-01YouTube ↗
RSA 4096 Keys and Choosing the Certificate ChainYouTube ↗
One Certificate Across Several DNS ZonesYouTube ↗